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The evolution of mutualism with modifiers




















for	 donation-	suppressing	 modifiers.	We	 present	 conditions	 under	 which	 modifiers	
that	suppress	costly	donation	receive	either	positive	or	negative	selection;	assortment	
only	at	the	donation	 locus	always	 leads	to	selection	for	donation	suppression,	as	 in	




propriately	explained	by	 indirect	 fitness	benefits	within	 the	donating	species,	using	
partner	species	as	vectors	for	altruism.	Our	work	has	implications	for	identifying	both	
the	stability	and	the	ultimate	beneficiaries	of	social	behavior	between	species.













(Archetti	 et	al.,	 2011;	 Bull	 &	 Rice,	 1991;	 Fletcher	&	Doebeli,	 2009;	
Fletcher	 &	 Zwick,	 2006;	 Foster	 &	Wenseleers,	 2006;	 Frank,	 1994,	
1997;	 Gardner,	 West,	 &	 Wild,	 2011;	 Herre,	 Knowlton,	 Mueller,	 &	
Rehner,	1999).	Yet,	the	evolution	of	mutualism	is	arguably	not	as	well	
understood	as	the	evolution	of	within-	species	social	behavior.























relatedness,	 governs	 interactions;	 this	 is	 intended	 to	 correspond,	 as	
much	as	possible,	with	Hamilton’s	scenario	for	altruism	in	kin	groups.	
In	 this	 case,	 assortment	 is	no	 longer	 local.	Finally,	we	alter	 the	 sec-
ond	 case	 to	 consider	 a	 facultative	 greenbeard	 situation,	 in	 which	
donators	only	donate	 to	other	donators.	We	analyze	all	 cases	using	
quasi-	linkage	equilibrium	 (QLE)	 (Kimura,	1965;	Kirkpatrick,	Johnson,	













nario	because	 this	 reduces	 the	potential	 for	within-	species	 altruism	
that	might	be	mistaken	for	between-	species	altruism;	for	example,	a	
honeybee	collects	nectar	while	pollinating	a	plant	but	uses	it	to	raise	
siblings	 rather	 than	 offspring	 (Foster	 &	 Wenseleers,	 2006;	 Frank,	


















that	only	hold	 the	donation	allele	 shall	be	 referred	 to	as	bearers	of	





only	 interacts	once	during	 its	 lifetime	and	 is	 randomly	assigned	 the	
role	of	either	potential	donor	or	potential	recipient	(Quickfall,	2016).
Given	the	above	model,	donation	is	altruistic	whenever	b > c > 0; 
note	 that	 fecundity	 and	 personal	 fitness	 are	 equivalent	 in	 this	
case,	 as	 local	 competition	 is	assumed	not	 to	 take	place	 (Hamilton,	
1964a,b;	Taylor,	1992;	Wyatt	et	al.,	2013).	Our	model	makes	use	of	
the	 neighbor-	modulated	 fitness	method	 of	 analyzing	 social	 evolu-
tion	(Taylor	&	Frank,	1996),	where	“neighbors”	are	members	of	the	
partner	species.	We	take	the	simplest	case	in	which	additive	fitness	




We	analyze	 this	model	 using	 three	methods,	 the	Price	equation	
(Appendices	 S1–3),	QLE	 (Appendix	 S4:	 Section	 4.2.1),	 and	 stochas-
tic	simulation	(Appendix	S4:	Section	4.2.2).	Analytic	discussion	of	the	
Price	 approach	 is	 restricted	 to	 the	 appendix,	 as	 is	 some	 further	 ex-











We	first	consider	assortment	on	a	single	 locus.	This	 is	 similar	 to	
the	thought-	experiment	introduced	by	Fletcher	and	Doebeli	(2009)	in	
which	a	hypothetical	experimenter	manipulates	interactions	such	that	
donating	 genotypes	 in	 each	 species	 are	 always	 paired	 (i.e.,	 if	G	=	1,	
then	G′	=	1,	 and	vice	versa);	 the	main	difference	with	 this	 is	 the	 in-







































4.2.2)	 approaches	 complement	 the	 Price	 equation	 analysis	 of	 the	
Appendix	(S1–S3)	by	showing	that	when	assortment	occurs	at	a	single	
behavior-	producing	locus	in	each	species,	selection	for	donation	sup-





Under	 our	 second	 scenario,	 in	which	 assortment	 between	 spe-















whether	or	not	donators	 realize	 a	net	direct	 lifetime	 fitness	benefit	
from	interacting	with	 like	 individuals	 (Appendix	S4:	Section	4.1)	and	
are	robust	to	finite	population	size	and	strong	selection	(Appendix	S4:	
Section	4.3).
We	now	turn	 to	our	 final	 scenario,	 in	which	donators	can	 reject	
interactions	 with	 nondonators	 and	 thus	 act	 similarly	 to	 facultative	
greenbeards	(Gardner	&	West,	2010).	Assortment	remains	genomew-
ide,	as	in	our	second	scenario.	In	this	case,	donation	reaches	fixation	
if	b > c	 (Quickfall,	2016).	Note	that	the	greenbeards	account	for	the	
modifier,	 as	 it	 is	 implicit	 that	 greenbeards	 recognize	 their	 partner’s	
allele	on	the	“modifier”	locus.	Since	greenbeards	may	typically	be	gene	
complexes	 (Gardner	&	West,	2010),	 this	amounts	 to	defining	a	new	
greenbeard	trait	that	includes	the	modifier	 locus.	Thus,	these	green-


















marker	 that	 leads	 to	 receipt	 of	 benefits,	 and	 examples	 of	 this	 have	
F IGURE  1 Stable	proportions	of	donators	in	each	species	for	
intermediate	whole-	genomic	assortment	rates	α;	model	parameters	












































lution	 of	 flower	 and	mouthpart	 designs	may	 lead	 to	 stable	 associa-
tion	at	portions	of	the	species’	genomes	associated	with	these	traits,	













Genomewide	 relatedness	 in	 single	 species	 arises	 in	 family-	
structured	 groups,	 which	 can	 provide	 the	 conditions	 necessary	 for	
the	evolution	of	extreme	altruism	such	as	worker	sterility	in	eusocial	
insects	 (Fig.	2b).	 Our	 results	 show	 that	 in	 two-	species	 associations,	
whole-	genome	association	 also	 allows	 costly	 interspecific	 behaviors	
to	be	stable.	Biological	instances	of	such	associations	may	seem	hard	
to	 conceive	of;	we	 suggest	 that	 even	 if	 this	 is	 the	 case,	 theory	has	
previously	led	the	way	to	discovery	of	real	biological	phenomena,	with	
greenbeard	traits	themselves	being	a	case	in	point	(Gardner	&	West,	
2010).	 We	 further	 suggest	 that	 stable	 endosymbioses,	 particularly	
those	 in	which	 endosymbionts	 are	 perfectly	 heritable,	 may	 provide	
the	kind	of	interspecies	association	that	corresponds	to	our	model	of	
costly	interspecies	donation.
Previous	work	 has	 shown	 that	 costly	 interspecies	 donation	 can	
be	 analyzed	 as	 instances	 of	within-	species	 altruism,	 but	 that	 a	 be-
tween	 species	 altruism	 interpretation	 is	 also	 possible	 (Wyatt	 et	al.,	
2013).	However,	we	argue	 that	 it	 is	 arbitrary	 to	 terminate	 the	path	
of	 received	 benefits	 in	 the	 partner	 species,	when	 it	 continues	 back	








beard	 theory	 and	mutualism	 theory.	When	possible	modifiers	 favor	
suppression	of	 greenbeards	within	 and	between	 species,	 this	 is	 be-































































efits	are	additive	and	 the	same	 from	both	species’	point	of	view.	 In	
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